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Abstract
Some courts of Regional Economic Communities deal with human rights and 
they base their decisions on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. Other subregional courts have directly or indirectly considered human 
rights matters. However, it is not clear whether the cases decided by 
subregional courts are admissible before the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights or the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
Focusing on the Economic Community of West African States Court of Justice, 
the East African Court of Justice, and the Southern African Development 
Community Tribunal, I argue that the African Commission or the African Court 
should not admit cases decided by subregional courts. First, accepting such 
cases would overburden the African Commission and the African Court. 
Second, the decisions of subregional courts are final according to the treaties 
establishing them. Third, states should not be tried twice by international 
institutions for the same violation. Fourth, decisions of subregional courts have 
res judicata effect. Fifth, subregional courts are envisaged under Article 56(7) 
of the African Charter. Finally, the African Court or the African Commission 
can interpret the text of the African Charter to preclude the admissibility of 
cases decided by subregional courts.
Key words
Admissibility, African Commission, African Court, subregional courts, res
judicata
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/mlr. v6i2.3
Acronyms and Abbreviations
RECs Regional Economic Communities
EAC East African Community
§ LLB (Haramaya University), LLM (University of Pretoria); Postgraduate Diploma 
(Abo Akademi University); Lecturer and Post-Graduate Programme Coordinator, 
School of Law, Addis Ababa University; <abdeejibril@gmail.com>. The author is 
very grateful to Professor Frans Viljoen and Assistant Professor Brooke I Glass- 
O’Shea for their constructive comments. He also thanks the anonymous reviewers for 
their comments. Any remaining errors are the author’s sole responsibility.
242 Mizan Law Review Vol. 6 No.2, December 2012
SADC
EACJ
ECOWAS
ICCPR
OP-CEDAW
Southern African Development Community
East African Court of Justice
Economic Community of West African States
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women
Introduction
African states have established Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to 
achieve increased trade and improved economic links.1 RECs serve as the 
building blocks for the economic integration of Africa.2 While pursuing these 
goals, they recognise the enhanced role of human rights, inter alia, as a means 
to their economic development.3 In the Algiers Declaration, African leaders 
identified a political environment in which human rights are observed as a 
precondition to economic growth.4 They also recognised that conflict, one of the 
obstacles to economic growth, may arise from the violation of human rights.5 
For these reasons and others, RECs are involved in human rights matters.
Treaties establishing the RECs recognise the promotion and protection of 
human rights among their principles and different organs have been established 
to achieve these objectives.6 Some of these organs contribute to human rights
1 Frans Viljoen (2007), International Human Rights Law in Africa (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), p.495.
2 Art 88(1), Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, adopted in 1991 in 
Abuja, Nigeria and entered into force in 1994.
3 See Magdalena Sepulveda et. al. (2004), Human Rights Reference Handbook (San 
Jose: University for Peace), p.403; Oliver Christian Ruppel ‘Regional economic 
communities and human rights in East and southern Africa’ in Anton Bosl & Joseph 
Diescho (eds) (2009),Human Rights in Africa: Legal Perspectives on their Protection 
and Promotion (Windhoek: Macmillan Education), p. 279. Respect for human rights 
immensely contributes to economic development. See also Nneoma Nwogu (2007), 
‘Regional integration as an instrument of human rights: Reconceptualizing ECOWAS, 
Journal of Human Rights 345.
4 Declaration on the Political and Socio-economic Situation in Africa and the 
Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (the Algiers Declaration), OAU Doc 
AHG/Decl. 1 (XXVI), para 10 - 11.
5 Rachel Murray (2004), Human Rights in Africa: from the OAU to the African Union 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press), p.126.
6 See Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development 
Community (as Amended), art 4(c); Treaty Establishing the East African Community, 
art 6(d); Treaty of ECOWAS, art 4(g); COMESA Treaty, art 6(e). These treaties were 
reproduced in Solomon Ebobrah & Armand Tanoh (eds) (2010), Compendium of
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through setting standards.7 Other organs of RECs such as subregional courts 
can positively contribute to the protection of human rights. Subregional courts 
are organs of RECs vested with judicial powers. Some of them have decided 
human rights cases. Although it is advantageous to have as many institutions as 
possible to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights, overlapping 
judicial powers of organs raise concerns such as the possibility of divergent 
conclusions on the same issues, duplication of efforts, and inefficient allocation 
and use of scarce resources, particularly when different courts have jurisdiction 
over the same case.8
In Yogogombaye v Senegal, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (African Court) was confronted with issues that had already been raised 
before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice.9 Such issues render the 
discussion on admissibility of cases decided by subregional courts before the 
African Court relevant. Although such a case has never been presented to the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), it is 
important to discuss admissibility before it because the African Commission is 
the main forum through which cases come to the African Court. So far, few 
countries have made declarations under Article 34(6) of the African Court 
Protocol and individuals or NGOs can bring cases to the African Court against 
these states only. Cases against other states should come to the African Court 
through the African Commission.10
African Sub-Regional Human Rights Documents (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law 
Press).
7 The supreme organs of the RECs adopt instruments that address human rights issues.
8 See Viljoen (2007), supra note 1, p. 501; Abdul Rahaman Lamin ‘African sub­
regional human rights courts: the ECOWAS Court of Justice, the SADC Tribunal and 
the EAC Court of Justice in comparative perspective’ in John Akokpari & Daniel 
Shea Zimbler (eds) (2008), Africa’s Human Rights Architecture (Fanele: Auckland 
Park), p.239; Kithure Kindiki (2006) ‘The African Human Rights System: 
Unnecessary Overlap or Useful Synergies?’ East African Journal of Peace and 
Human Rights Vol. 12, p. 332.
9 Yogogombaye v Senegal (2009) AHRLR 315 (ACtHPR 2009). The case was brought 
to the African Court to obtain suspension of proceedings instituted by Senegal in order 
to charge, try and sentence Mr Hissein Habre, former Head of State of Chad who had 
asylum in Senegal. The African Court declared the case inadmissible on the ground 
that the applicant lacks standing. See also Hissein Habre v Republic of Senegal, 
General Role No. ECW/CCJ/APP/07/08 Judgment No: ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10, ruling 
delivered on 18 November 2010. The same case was brought before the ECOWAS 
Court of Justice on 6 October 2008 and was decided on 18 November 2010.
10 See African Commission on Human and Peoples ’ Rights v the Great Socialist Libyan 
People’s Arab Jamahiriya, Application No. 004/2011, ruling 2 September 2011. The 
African Court rejected most cases on the ground that the respondent state did not 
make declaration under art 34(6) of the African Court Protocol. See, for example,
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Regulating the admissibility of cases decided by subregional courts would 
alleviate problems such as duplication of efforts or the possibility of divergent 
conclusions. The article addresses this issue in four sections. The first section 
provides the background on subregional courts and briefly discusses their 
establishment and human rights mandate. Section 2 provides an overview of 
Article 56(7) of the African Charter on pending and settled matters in relation to 
other international and regional human rights instruments. Section 3 discusses 
the reasons why cases decided by subregional courts should not be admitted 
before the African Commission or the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (the African Court).
1. Human Rights Mandate of Subregional Courts
Most treaties establishing Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that were 
adopted or revised after the adoption of the African Charter recognise the 
promotion and protection of human rights as one of their principles.11 These 
treaties have established judicial bodies that, to some extent, have been dealing 
with human rights matters. The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice is the 
pioneer in upholding human rights because it has clear human rights 
jurisdiction. The East African Court of Justice and the SADC Tribunal have also 
dealt with human rights matters.
1.1. ECOWAS Community Court of Justice
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established 
in 1975 with the objective of economic integration.12 In July 1993, the member 
states revised the Establishing Treaty.13 One reason for the revision seems to 
have been the developments in the field of human rights in ECOWAS and the
Daniel Amare and Mulugeta Amare v Republic of Mozambique and Mozambique 
Airlines, application No. 005/2011, Decision of 16 June 2011; National Convention 
of Teachers Trade Union v The Republic of Gabon, Application No 012/2011, 
decision 15 December 2011; Delta International Investments S.A., Mr and Mrs A.G.L. 
De Lange v The Republic of South Africa, Application No 002/2012, decision 30 
March 2012; Emmanuel Joseph Uko and Others v The Republic of South Africa, 
Application No 004/2012; Amir Adam Timan v The Republic of Sudan, Application 
No 005/2012, decision 30 March 2012; Baghdadi Ali Mahmoudi v. The Republic of 
Tunisia, Application No 007/2012, decision 26 June 2012.
11 Supra note 6.
12 Solomon Ebobrah (2007), ‘A Rights-Protection Goldmine or A Waiting Volcanic 
Eruption? Competence of, and Access to, the Human Rights Jurisdiction of the 
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice’, African Human Rights Law Journal 309, 
Vol. 7, p. 309.
13 Ibid, p. 310.
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continent.14 The revised ECOWAS Treaty re-established the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice together with seven other organs of the 
Community.15
The Protocol on the ECOWAS Court did not confer human rights jurisdiction 
on the Court.16 The Court acquired jurisdiction on human rights in 2005 by a 
Supplementary Protocol amending the establishing Protocol of 1991.17 The 
human rights jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court is the power to hear cases for 
violations of ‘the so-called Community rights endowed on ECOWAS citizens’ 
and the power of the Court to receive cases on violations of the African 
Charter.18 The former is similar with the inter-state complaint mechanism of the 
African Charter as ‘the ECOWAS Commission acquires access to bring human 
rights case against a member state where the state fails to perform its human 
rights obligations under the ECOWAS legal regime.’19
The ECOWAS Court of Justice's jurisdiction on human rights is largely due 
to the recognition that human rights and access to justice in the sub-region are 
fundamental values of the ECOWAS Community enshrined in Articles 4(g), 
56(2) and 63(2) of the 1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty and Articles 9(4) and 
10(d) of the 2005 supplementary protocol.20 Individuals can also bring 
complaints that allege violation of the African Charter and other human rights 
instruments before the ECOWAS Court.21 The following examples illustrate this 
point.
14 The Preamble to the Treaty of ECOWAS, adopted by the Heads of State and 
Government of the Member States of ECOWAS in Cotonou on 24 July 1993. The 
preamble refers to African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 1991 
Declaration on Political Principles of the Economic Community of West African 
States.
15 Art 6(1)(e) & art 15, the Treaty of ECOWAS. See A Banjo ‘The ECOWAS Court and 
the politics of access to justice in West Africa’ (2007) 32 Africa Development 73.
16 Protocol A/P/1/7/91 on the Community Court of Justice adopted on 6 July 1991 in 
Lagos, Nigeria and entered into force on 5 November 1996.
17 Supplementary Protocol A/SP1/01/05 to Protocol on the Community Court of Justice 
(1991) adopted in 2005 which provisionally came into force upon signature in 2005, 
reproduced in Ebobrah & Tanoh, supra note 6, p. 199.
18 Enyinna S. Nwauche ‘Regional economic communities and human rights in West 
Africa and the African Arabic countries’ in Anton Bosl & Joseph Diescho (eds) 
(2009) Human rights in Africa: Legal perspectives on their protection and promotion 
332.
19 Ebobrah, supra note 12, p. 314.
20 Muhammed Tawfik Ladan (2009), Introduction to ECOWAS Community Law and 
Practice: Integration, Migration, Human Rights, Access to Justice, Peace and 
Security (Zaria: The Ahamdu Bello University Press), p. 269-280.
21 See Nwauche , supra note 18, p. 332; Ebobrah , supra note 12, p. 314.
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In Manneh v The Gambia, the Court considered a case submitted against The 
Gambia by legal counsels of Chief Ebrimah Manneh, a Gambian journalist who 
was arrested without warrant by two officials of the National Intelligence 
Agency of The Gambia.22 The officials did not give any reason for his arrest. 
The plaintiff had been detained incommunicado. He had been detained for more 
than a year without any criminal charge. The counsels for the plaintiff submitted 
that the defendant violated Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the African Charter. They 
requested the Court to order the defendant to release the plaintiff and pay him 
five million US dollars in damages. Although the defendant refused to make an 
appearance, the Court heard witnesses and found that Articles 2, 6 and 7(1) of 
the African Charter were violated.23 The Court also ordered the defendant to 
pay US$ 100,000 to the plaintiff as damages.24
In Koraou v Niger, the Court considered a case of Hadijatou Mani Koraou, a 
Nigerien woman who was sold at the age of 12 to a 46 years-old man as “the 
fifth wife” called sadaka for the sum of 240,000 CFA Francs.25 The sale was 
conducted according to wahiya practice which was prevalent in Niger and 
consisted of “acquiring a young girl, generally under the conditions of servitude, 
for her to serve both as domestic servant and concubine.”26 “The sadaka 
generally carries out the domestic chores and caters for the ‘master’” who can 
engage her in sexual relations at any time.27 The plaintiff had served her master 
for nine years and obtained a certificate of emancipation from him in 2005.28
However, the ‘master’ refused to let the plaintiff free even after she obtained 
certificate of emancipation.29 She escaped from her master and brought a case 
against him which led to a judgment that she had never been married to her 
master.30 While her civil case was being considered by appellate courts, the 
plaintiff was prosecuted for bigamy upon the complaint of the master.31 The 
plaintiff, her brother and her husband were sentenced to six months 
imprisonment and a fine, and they were incarcerated until they were released on
appeal.32
22Manneh v The Gambia (2008) AHRLR 171 (ECOWAS 2008), para 5.
23 Ibid, para 41.
24 Ibid, para 44
25 Koraou vNiger (2008) AHRLR 182 (ECOWAS 2008), para 8.
26 Ibid, para 9.
27 Ibid, para 10.
28 Ibid, para 13.
29 Ibid, para 14.
30 Ibid, para 15-16.
31 Ibid, para 21.
32 Ibid, para 22-23.
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Meanwhile, the plaintiff sued the Republic of Niger before the ECOWAS 
Court of Justice for violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 18(3) of the African 
Charter.33 Upon request of the plaintiff, the Court transferred its session to 
Niamey for hearing.34 Having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, the Convention relating to Slavery, the Convention relating to 
the Abolition of Slavery, Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the ECOWAS 
Court of Justice declared that the plaintiff was a victim of slavery and awarded 
her CFA 10,000,000.35 The Court blamed the defendant for inaction of its 
administrative and judicial authorities.36
In Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights & Accountability 
Project (SERAP) v Nigeria, the ECOWAS Court of Justice dealt with 
admissibility of a case brought against the Federal Republic of Nigeria by 
human rights non-governmental organisation registered under the laws of the 
defendant. The plaintiff alleged that Nigeria violated Articles 1, 2, 17, 21 and 22 
of the African Charter. 37 The ruling of the ECOWAS Court of Justice regarding 
jurisdiction was the following:
This court clearly has subject matter jurisdiction over human rights 
violations in so far as these are recognized by the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is adopted by Article 4(g) of the 
Revised Treaty of ECOWAS. As the plaintiff s claim is premised on 
Articles 1, 2, 17, 21 and 22 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, the Court does have subject matter jurisdiction of the 
suit filed by the plaintiff.38
After asserting its jurisdiction over the case, the Court held that “[i]t is trite law 
that this court is empowered to apply the provisions of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and Article 17 thereof guarantees the right to 
education. It is well established that the rights guaranteed by the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights are justiciable before this court”.39 The 
ECOWAS Court of Justice has been acclaimed as the first international judicial
33 Ibid, para 28.
34 Ibid, para 31-34.
35 Ibid,para 96.
36 Ibid.
37 Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights & Accountability Project (SERAP) 
v Nigeria (2009) AHRLR 331 (ECOWAS 2009).
38 Ibid, para 13.
39 Ibid, para 19.
248 Mizan Law Review Vol. 6 No.2, December 2012
body to uphold justiciability of socio-economic rights because of its holding that 
the right to basic education is justiciable before it.40
1.2. East African Court of Justice
Cooperation among Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda dates back to the colonial era. 
In 1917, Kenya and Uganda formed Customs Union, and Tanzania (then 
Tanganyika) joined in 1927.41 The Customs Union was followed by the East 
African High Commission (1948-1961) and the East African Common Services 
Organisation (1961-1967).42 In 1967, the East African Community was 
established and took over the assets and liabilities of the East African Common 
Service Organisation.43 The East African Community lasted for ten years and 
became defunct in 1977 for various reasons.44 The businesspersons in Kenya put 
pressure on the government to withdraw.45 “Differences in economic policies 
and political approaches” were considered as reasons for the failure.46 The 
present East African Community (EAC) was re-launched in 1999.47 The areas of 
co-operation among members of EAC include political, social and cultural 
fields, research and technology, defence, security, and legal and judicial 
affairs.48 To achieve these objectives, the EAC Treaty sets out fundamental and 
operational principles that include the promotion and protection of human 
rights.49
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) is one of the seven organs that 
were established by EAC Treaty.50 It exercises the judicial function of the EAC 
through its first instance and appellate divisions.51 The EAC Treaty vests human
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
Frans Viljoen ‘The African Regional Human Rights System’ in Catarina Krause & 
Martin Scheinin (2012), International Protection of Human Rights: A Text Book 
(Turku: Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University), p. 555.
History of the EAC: From Cooperation to Community, available at
<http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44&Itemid=54>
Ibid.
Viljoen, supra note 1, p. 490.
Ibid.
Ibid
Ibid
Art 2(1) of Treaty Establishing East African Community, signed on 30 November 
1999, came into force 7 July 2000, and amended on 14 December 2006 and 20 
August 2007. The EAC Treaty was concluded among Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. 
Rwanda and Burundi acceded to the Treaty on 18 June 2007. See also Viljoen , supra 
note 1, p. 490; Ruppel , supra note 3, p. 301.
Art 5(1), EAC Treaty.
Art 6(d) & 7(2), EAC Treaty.
Art 9(1), EAC Treaty.
Art 9(1)(e) & 23(2), EAC Treaty.
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rights jurisdiction in the EACJ, but postpones its operation until a future 
protocol authorises the commencement of the human rights jurisdiction.52
In Katabazi v Secretary-General of the East African Community, the Court 
was seized with a case in which ugandan security personnel interfered with 
preparation of bail documents by surrounding Ugandan High Court and re­
arresting persons who were released on bail.53 The arrested persons were taken 
before a military General Court Martial which remanded them in custody.54 
Although the Ugandan Constitutional Court ruled that the interference of the 
security personnel with the High Court was unconstitutional, the arrested 
persons were not released.55 The plaintiffs mainly invoked the violation of the 
EAC Treaty. The Court held that “jurisdiction with respect to human rights 
requires a determination of the Council and a conclusion of a Protocol to that 
effect.”56 Since both of those steps did not take place, the Court held that “this 
Court may not adjudicate on disputes concerning violation of human rights per 
se.”57 However, the Court has shown some judicial activism.58 It held that ‘the 
intervention by the armed security agents of Uganda to prevent the execution of 
a lawful court order violated the principle of the rule of law.’59 Actually, the 
EACJ upheld the right to liberty and claimed jurisdiction in human rights cases 
by framing its decisions in terms of treaty violations.
in East African Law Society v Attorney-General of Kenya, the applicant 
challenged the procedure of amending the EAC Treaty on the ground that it did 
not consult the people.60 Triggered by earlier decisions of the Court, the 
amendment modified the Court’s structure by introducing an appellate division. 
The impact of the amendment was negative as it narrowed the jurisdiction of the 
Court and provided a time limit within which references by natural and judicial 
persons may be instituted before the Court. The Court held that ‘the lack of 
people’s participation in the impugned amendment process was inconsistent 
with the spirit and intendment of the Treaty.’61 In essence, the Court upheld the
52 Art 27 (2), EAC Treaty.
53 Katabazi and Others v Secretary-General of the East African Community and 
Another (2007) AHRLR 119 (EAC 2007), para 2.
54 Ibid, para 3.
55 Ibid,para 4.
56 Ibid, para 34.
57 Ibid.
58 Solomon T Ebobrah (2009), ‘Human rights development in sub-regional courts in 
Africa in 2008’ African Human Rights Law Journal Vol. 9, p. 315.
59 Katabazi case , supra note 53, para 54.
60 East African Law Society and Others v Attorney-General of Kenya and Others, 
Reference 3 of 2007 at 11.
61 Ibid, p. 42.
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right to participation of the people which is guaranteed under Article 13 of the 
African Charter although it did not refer to the latter.
The protocol that would trigger the human rights jurisdiction of the EACJ 
was drafted in 2007 by the EAC Secretariat.62 However, it has not come into 
force yet. Recent developments in the region show that pressure was exerted on 
the EAC to expand the jurisdiction of the EACJ to cover human rights cases.63
1.3. The SADC Tribunal
The Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference, a loose association 
of states, was created in 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia.64 The Conference was 
transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 
1992 in Windhoek, Namibia.65 The state parties to the Treaty establishing 
SADC were aware of the need to observe human rights to involve their people 
in regional integration.66 The Treaty requires SADC and its Member States to 
act in accordance with ‘human rights, democracy and the rule of law.’67 It 
establishes the SADC Tribunal along with seven other institutions.68
The SADC Tribunal is vested with the judicial power of the Community.69 It 
was established to interpret the provisions of the SADC Treaty and its 
subsidiary instruments,’70 with both contentious and advisory jurisdiction.71 The 
SADC Treaty and the Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure thereof
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Solomon T Ebobrah (2010), ‘Human rights developments in African sub-regional 
economic communities during 2009’ African Human Rights Law Journal , Vol. 10, 
p. 240.
Ibid.
Munetsi Madakufamba (2007), ‘SADC in the twenty-first century’, Open Space: a 
digest of Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa vol. 2 p. 90. See also Viljoen, 
supra note 1, p. 492.
Mbugua Mureithi ‘The Impact of regional courts in Africa in fostering regional 
integration and the development of international human rights jurisprudence’ in 
George Mukundi Wachira (ed.) (2007), Judiciary Watch Report: Regional and Sub­
regional Platforms for Vindicating Human Rights in Africa (Nirobi: Kenyan Section 
of International Commission of Jurists), p. 84; Madakufamba, supra note 64, p. 91. 
SADC Treaty , preamble.
SADC Treaty, Art 4 (c).
SADC Treaty, Art 9 (1).
SADC Treaty, Art 9.
SADC Treaty, Art 16(1); Art 14, Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure
thereof.
71 SADC Treaty, Art 16(1) & (4).
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do not provide that the Tribunal has jurisdiction on specific disputes,72 nor do 
they exclude from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal any dispute under any field of 
law.73
To ascertain the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over a given dispute, one needs to 
examine whether SADC has legal instruments that govern the area of the 
dispute, because the Tribunal has jurisdiction over instruments applicable in 
SADC.74 75 The Tribunal has jurisdiction over human rights because SADC has 
human rights instruments that include the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 
and the Protocol on Gender and Development. The Tribunal itself confirmed 
that it has jurisdiction on human rights in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited v 
Zimbabwe15
In the Campbell case, the SADC Tribunal entertained a case in which the 
government of Zimbabwe compulsorily acquired agricultural land on the basis 
of constitutional amendment that vests ownership of acquired land in the State 
of Zimbabwe and sets aside the jurisdiction of courts to question the legality of 
such compulsory acquisition. The agricultural lands were mainly acquired from 
white owners who, for reasons attributable to colonial history, happened to own 
large tracts of land suitable for agriculture. The applicants submitted that the 
enactment and implementation of the constitutional amendment violated the 
SADC Treaty. They also alleged that they were denied access to justice and 
compensation for their land as well as equal treatment. The respondent state 
challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over the matters. In confirming its 
jurisdiction, the Tribunal relied on Article 21(b) (the Protocol on Tribunal and 
Rules of Procedure Thereof) which requires reference to ‘treaties, general 
principles and rules of public international law and any rules and principles of 
the law of States.’ The Tribunal held that it ‘has jurisdiction in respect of any 
dispute concerning human rights, democracy and the rule of law.’76
According to some commentators, the SADC Tribunal has competence to 
interpret even non-SADC instruments.77 The subject-matter jurisdiction of the
72 See generally the SADC Treaty; The Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure 
Thereof, adopted on 7 August 2000 in Windhoek, Namibia by the SADC Heads of 
State and Government and entered into force on 14 August 2001, reproduced in 
Ebobrah & Tanoh , supra note 6, p. 375.
73 Compare art 27 (2), EAC Treaty where the Treaty confers human right jurisdiction on 
the court and suspends it.
74 See Article 16 of SADC Treaty and Article 14 of the Protocol on Tribunal and the 
Rules of Procedure Thereof.
75 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Limited and Others v Zimbabwe (2008) AHRLR 199 (SADC 
2008).
76 Ibid, para 32.
77 Mmatsie Mooki ‘African regional courts and their role in the promotion and 
protection of human rights: The Southern African Development Community
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SADC Tribunal ‘clearly covers human rights issues, including the interpretation 
and application of the African Charter.’78 The Tribunal seems to have concurred 
with this view in the Campbell case. It “first referred to Article 21(b) which, in 
addition to enjoining the Tribunal to develop its own jurisprudence, also 
instructs the Tribunal to do so ‘having regard to applicable treaties, general 
principles and rules of public international law’ which are sources of law for the 
Tribunal”. 79 In this holding, the Tribunal made it clear that its sources of law are 
not limited to SADC instruments. Rather, the Tribunal situated itself in a 
position similar to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.80 Thus, the 
African Charter and other treaties are sources of law for the SADC Tribunal.
Campbell and other cases brought against zimbabwe seem to have 
boomeranged on the very existence of the SADC Tribunal. Because of the 
Tribunal’s holding in that case, Zimbabwe questioned the legality of the SADC 
Tribunal.81 As a result, the SADC Summit first refused to fill vacancies on the 
Tribunal and subsequently suspended the Tribunal at the 2010 SADC Summit.82 83 
Although the Summit has the power to amend SADC Treaty, the procedure it 
followed in suspending the Tribunal was ultra vires8
Tribunal’ in George Mukundi Wachira (ed) (2007), Judiciary Watch Report:
Regional and Sub-regional Platforms for Vindicating Human Rights in Africa 
(Nirobi: Kenyan Section of International Commission of Jurists), p. 39. Mooki 
concluded that the use of treaties which promotes and protects human rights by the 
SADC Tribunal is inevitable. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu ‘Complementarity,
Competition or Contradiction: The Relationship between the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and Regional Economic Courts in East and Southern Africa’ 
(Unpublished) (Presentation to Conference of East and Southern African States on the 
Protocol Establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Gaborone, 
Botswana, 9-10 December 2003) at
<http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/images/docs/research- 
papers/chidioncomplementarity.pdf> (accessed on 13 November 2011).
78 Odinkalu, Ibid, p. 9.
79 Campbell case, supra note 75, para 31.
80 Compare Art 7, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the 
establishment of an African Court on Human and People's Rights, adopted in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, on 10 June 1998, OAU DOC. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT 
(III). Art 7 empowers the African Court to apply the provisions of the African Charter 
and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned.
81 Viljoen (2012), supra note 40, p. 556.
82 Ibid; Solomon T Ebobrah (2012), ‘Human rights developments in African sub­
regional economic communities during 2011’ 12 African Journal of Human Rights 
Law 223, Vol. 12, p. 225.
83 ‘SADC Tribunal Dissolved by Unanimous Decision of SADC Leaders’, Speech by 
Ariranga G. Pillay, Former President of SADC Tribunal, available at
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On 17 August 2012, the SADC Summit disbanded the Tribunal and directed 
SADC Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-Generals to negotiate a new protocol 
in order to reconstitute the Tribunal with a fresh mandate.84 The mandate of a 
new tribunal will be ‘confined to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and 
Protocols relating to disputes between Member States.85
Civil society organisations are campaigning against the decision of the 
SADC Summit that disbanded the Tribunal. Part of their campaigning activities 
includes resorting to continental human rights bodies: the African Commission 
and the African Court. The African Commission has accepted the admissibility 
of a communication about the decision of the SADC leaders to suspend the 
Tribunal.86 The communication has been submitted on behalf of Zimbabwean 
farmers, and all 15 SADC leaders have been cited as respondents.87 Pan African 
Lawyers Union and Southern Africa Litigation Centre have requested advisory 
opinion from the African Court on the legality of suspending the SADC 
Tribunal.88
2. Admissibility of Pending or Decided Cases in General
Some international human rights bodies do not admit cases that are pending 
before other international judicial or quasi-judicial organs. international human 
rights instruments treat such cases as simultaneously duplicating procedures 
(pendente lite). Other human rights bodies do not admit cases that have already 
been decided or settled, and there are bodies that do not admit both pending and 
decided cases.
The first category of international human rights bodies prohibits only 
simultaneously duplicating procedures. They may admit cases or communications 
that have already been decided under another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement. An example of this type of human rights body is the
<http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/article/files/Speech%20by%20former%20Pr 
esident%20of%20SADC%20Tribunal.pdf> (accessed on 6 February 2013).
84 Zvamaida Murwira ‘Southern Africa: Regional Leaders Permanently Disband SADC 
Tribunal’ 21 August 2012 All Africa, <available at 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201208210893 .html>.
85 ‘Southern African Development Community: SADC Tribunal’, available at 
<http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/>
86 Richard Lee ‘African Commission to hear SADC Tribunal case’ 22 November 2012, 
available at <http://www.osisa.org/law/regional/african-commission-hear-sadc- 
tribunal-case>
87 Ibid.
88 Richard Lee ‘African Court asked to rule on SADC Tribunal’ 22 November 2012, 
available at <http://www.osisa.org/law/regional/african-court-asked-rule-sadc- 
tribunal>.
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United Nations Human Rights Committee.89 Under Article 5(2)(a) of the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the Human Rights Committee does not consider an individual communication 
unless it has ascertained that ‘the same matter is not being examined under 
another procedure of international investigation or settlement.’90
In Fanali v Italy, the Human Rights Committee entertained a communication 
alleging violation of the right to appeal contrary to Article 14(5) of the ICCPR.91 
The author of the communication along with other defendants was tried and 
sentenced before the Constitutional Court of Italy. His co-defendants submitted 
complaints to the European Commission of Human Rights while the author did 
not. Since the respondent State made reservation under Article 5(2)(a) of the 
Optional Protocol, it argued that the communication was inadmissible as the 
same matter was being examined before the European Commission of Human 
Rights. The Human Rights Committee rejected the respondent’s argument and 
defined ‘the same matter’ as ‘including the same claim concerning the same 
individual, submitted by him or someone else who has the standing to act on his 
behalf before the other international body.’92 Although it did not find violation, 
the Committee found the communication admissible.
In O.F. v Norway, the Human Rights Committee was seized with a 
communication against Norway for violation of Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).93 Although the case was 
submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, it was rejected since 
it was not submitted within six months from the time of exhaustion of local 
remedies. while considering admissibility of the communication, the Human 
Rights Committee accepted Norway’s argument that ‘Article 5(2)(a) [of the 
Optional Protocol] prevents simultaneous duplicating procedures.’ Since the 
European Commission of Human Rights did not examine the communication,
89 Other example include the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights under art 
46(1)(c) of the American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the Inter­
American Specialised Conference on Human Rights on 22 of November 1969 at San 
Jose, entered into force on 18 July 1978.
90 Art 5(2)(a) of Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 
entered into force on 23 March 1976.
91 Communication No. 75/1980, Fanali v Italy adopted on 31 March 1983 at eighteenth 
session of Human Rights Committee in International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional 
Protocol CCPR/C/OP/2 Vol 2 para 7.2, p. 100.
92 Ibid, para 7.2 at 100.
93 Communication No. 158/1983, O. F. vNorway (Human Rights Committee) (twenty- 
third session) 26 October 1984 CCPR/C/OP/2.
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the Human Rights Committee did not reject it on the grounds of prior 
examination. Rather, the Committee’s finding of inadmissibility was based on 
the author’s failure to substantiate his or her communication.
Through reservation, some countries exclude the Human Rights Committee 
from examining communications in which ‘the same matter has already been 
examined under other procedures of international investigation or settlement.’94 
Where such reservation exists, the Human Rights Committee does not admit 
communications pending before or decided by other international tribunals. 
Such reservation ‘sets forth the principle of non bis in idem.’95 This principle 
bars blaming a state twice for the same violation.
Among African countries, only uganda made similar reservation under the 
ICCPR.96 The reservation precludes the Human Rights Committee from 
reviewing cases against uganda that have already been decided by subregional 
and regional judicial or quasi-judicial bodies such as the East African Court of 
Justice, African Commission, the African Court or the African Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.
The second category of human rights bodies does not admit a case that has 
already been decided although they admit a case that is pending before other 
international bodies. Unlike the first category, simultaneously duplicating 
procedures are allowed under this category. The advantage of such a 
requirement is to avoid the ‘unsettling possibility of divergent “conclusions” to 
a particular matter before different bodies.’97
94 These countries Austria, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden , 
Turkey, Uganda, El Salvador, Moldova, and Sri Lanka. They are mostly European 
countries. See Reservation under the Optional Protocol to ICCPR, available at 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV- 
5&chapter=4&lang=en#2Some > (accessed on 11 February 2013).
95 O.F. v Norway.
96 Frans Viljoen ‘Communications under the African Charter: Procedure and 
Admissibility’ in Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray (eds) (2008), The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: the System in Practice 1986-2006 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University press), p. 127. The reservation provides that ‘Uganda does not 
accept the competence of the Human Rights Committee to consider a communication 
under the provisions of article 5 paragraph 2 from an individual if the matter in 
question has already been considered under another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement. ’ See
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV- 
5&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec> (accessed on 7 February 2013).
97 Ibid, p.126.
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The African Commission and the African Court belong to this category.98 99 
Article 56(7) of the African Charter precludes the African Commission from 
dealing with ‘cases which have been settled.’ However, the decisions of the 
African Commission do not seem consistent on this issue. For example, the 
African Commission, contrary to Article 56(7) of the African Charter, declared 
a communication inadmissible on the ground that it ‘had already been referred 
for consideration to the Human Rights Committee’ in Mpaka-Nsusu v Zaire" 
Although it does not come out from the records of the case, it may be surmised 
that the African Commission had learned reference of the case to the Human 
Rights Committee from submissions of the respondent state.
in another communication, the African Commission proceeded to consider a 
communication that had already been submitted to the Working Group of the 
United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities in Njoku v Egypt.100 The respondent challenged 
admissibility of the communication under Article 56(7) of the Charter. Rejecting 
the argument of the respondent, the Commission held that:
[Article 56(7)] talks about ‘cases which have been settled . . .’ It is therefore 
of the view that the decision of the United Nations Sub-Commission not to 
take any action and therefore not to pronounce on the communication 
submitted by the complainant does not boil down to a decision on the 
merits of the case and does not in any way indicate that the matter has been 
settled as envisaged under Article 56(7) of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. The Commission therefore rejected the arguments of 
the defendant.
The African Court decides on ‘the admissibility of cases taking into account the 
provisions of Article 56 of the Charter.’101 By referring to Article 56 of the
98 See art 6(2) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. This provision 
refers to art 56 of the African Charter. Other example include art 35 of European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
amended by Protocol No. 11, signed by the Members of the Council of Europe on 4 
November 1950 at Rome, entered into force on 3 September 1953.
99Mpaka-Nsusu v Zaire (2000) AHRLR 71 (ACHPR 1994), para 3-4.
100 Njoku v Egypt (2000) AHRLR 83 (ACHPR 1997), para 56. The Commission did not 
consider the matter settled as the Working Group of the United Nations Sub­
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities did not 
decide on the merit of the decision.
101 Protocol on the African Court, Art 6(2). It should be noted that the wording of Art 
6(2) of the Protocol gives more lee ways to the African Court. The Court need not 
strictly apply the provision of art 56(7). But the African Commission has no such lee 
ways. See Viljoen (2007), supra note 1, p. 448.
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African Charter, the establishing Protocol places the African Court in a similar 
position as the African Commission regarding admissibility of pending or 
decided cases and that position was confirmed in Rule 40(7) of the Rules of the 
African Court.102
The third category of human rights bodies does not admit cases that are 
pending before or have already been decided by other tribunals. For example, 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (OP-CEDAW) precludes the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women from examining a communication in which ‘the 
same matter has already been examined by the Committee or has been or is 
being examined under another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement.’103 Thus, OP-CEDAW and other similar human rights instruments 
prohibit pendente lite and establish the principle of non bis in idem.104
3. Reasons for the Inadmissibility of Cases Decided by 
Subregional Courts
3.1. Threat of Massive Backlog and Wise Use of Resources
Human rights treaty bodies consider communications or cases that comply with 
admissibility requirements. The requirements serve as screening mechanisms 
between national and international institutions or among international 
institutions.105 There is an apprehension that the absence of such screening
102 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Rules of Court, adopted and entered 
into force on 2 June 2010, rule 40(7).
103 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, adopted by UN General Assembly in resolution A/54/4 on 6 October 1999 
at New York and entered into force on 22 December 2000.
104 Other examples include Art 3(2)(c) of Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted on 10 December 2008 
by the General Assembly resolution A/RES/63/117; Art 30(2)(e) International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted 
by General Assembly resolution 61/177 of 20 December 2006; Art 2(c) of the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
adopted by General Assembly resolution 61/106 of 13 December 2006; Art 22(5)(a) 
of Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution 39/46 of 10 
December 1984 at New York, entered into force on 26 June 1987; Art 77(3)(a) of 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 
December 1990, entered into force on 1 July 2003.
105 some admissibility requirements (eg exhaustion of local remedies) serve as filtering 
mechanisms between national and international mechanisms. See Viljoen (2008),
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mechanisms overburdens international institutions with cases.106 Article 56(7) of 
the African Charter serves as a screening mechanism between the African 
Commission or the African Court and other international institutions. It is 
submitted that Article 56(7) of the African Charter can serve the purpose of 
reducing the number of cases that come to the African Commission and the 
African Court.
Both the African Commission and the Court do not have sufficient time and 
resources to deal with a massive number of cases. The African Commission is a 
part-time body.107 It carries out its mandate in ordinary and extraordinary 
sessions.108 The ordinary sessions of the Commission are held at least twice a 
year and they last for about two weeks unless the African Commission decides 
to reduce or extend the duration.109 The Chairperson of the African Commission 
may convene extraordinary sessions when requested by the majority of the 
commissioners or by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission.110
As a part-time body, the African Commission does not have sufficient time 
to carry out its functions. A perusal of its activity reports reveals that the 
Commission keeps postponing a large number of communications from one 
session to another. For example, on its 45th Ordinary Session held from 13 to 27 
May 2009, the Commission deferred to the next session 71 out of 80 
communications tabled for the Commission, among others, owing to time 
constraints.111 On its 46th Ordinary Session held from 11 to 25 November 2009, 
it deferred 62 communications for similar reasons.112 Although the Commission 
managed to hold the 7th Extraordinary Session from 5 to 12 October 2009 
between ordinary sessions, the backlog reduced only by nine communications.
106
107
108
109
110 
111
supra note 96, p. 88. The admissibility requirement that a communication must have 
not been settled by another procedure of international investigation or settlement 
serves as screening mechanisms between international institutions.
Viljoen (2008), Ibid, p. 88.
Viljoen (2007), supra note 1, p. 315.
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
approved by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights during its 47th 
ordinary session held in Banjul, The Gambia from May 12 to 26, 2010, Rule 25.
Ibid, Rule 26.
Ibid, Rule 27(2).
26th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) submitted in Accordance With Article 54 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, submitted to African Union Executive Council, 
Fifteenth Ordinary Session, 24 - 30 June 2009, Sirte, Libya , EX.CL/529(XV), para
141.
112 27th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) submitted in Accordance with Article 54 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, para 209.
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For similar reasons, 74 communications were deferred in its 47th Ordinary 
Session held from 12 to 26 May 2010, and other 74 communications were 
deferred in the 48th Ordinary Session held from 10 to 24 November 2010.113
Lack of human and financial resources has undermined the capacity of the 
African Commission to resolve its mounting backlog. The Commission has 
consistently been complaining about lack of support staff at its secretariat. on 
its 47th ordinary session, for instance, the Executive secretary reported that 
‘high staff turnover, combined with the [Commission’s] chronic understaffing, 
are some of the factors that lie at the heart of the challenges confronting the 
[Commission] in its processing and consideration of communications.’114 
Although the Executive Secretary reported improvements on the 48th Ordinary 
session, the report to the 49th ordinary session shows that the staffing problem 
was very critical and that it was no longer possible for the secretariat to provide 
the African Commission with ‘the support which it needed to function 
effectively and deliver on the mandate entrusted to it.’115 The problem of 
understaffing is mainly attributed to the lengthy process of the African Union 
Commission’s Human Resource Department.116
The African Commission consists of 11 members.117 Compared with its 
counterpart in the Inter-American system which consists of only seven 
members, 11 commissioners seem to be high.118 With a lesser number of 
commissioners, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is more 
productive than the African Commission.119 While the Inter-American 
Commission annually receives more than 1,500 petitions, the African 
Commission receives less than one per cent of that.120 Still, 11 commissioners 
are said to be insufficient to adequately implement the mandate of the African
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
28th Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR), submitted to AU Executive Council, Seventeenth Ordinary Session 19 - 
23 July 2010, Kampala, Uganda, EX.CL/600(XVII), para 212; 29th Activity Report 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), submitted to 
AU Executive Council, Nineteenth Ordinary Session 23—28 June 2011, Malabo, 
Equatorial Guinea, EX.CL/678(XIX), 184.
28th Activity Report, supra note 113, para 193.
29th Activity Report, supra note 113, para 224.
Magnus Killander & Adem K Abebe(2012), ‘Human rights developments in the 
African Union during 2010 and 2011’ African Journal of Human Rights Law 199, 
Vol. 12, at 201.
African Charter, Article 31.
American Convention on Human Rights adopted at the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Human Rights, San Jose, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969 and entered 
into force on 18 July 1978; O.A.S.T.S. 36; 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art 34.
Killander & Abebe, supra note 116.
Ibid.
Commission.121 In 2006, it was recommended that the number of commissioners 
be increased from 11 to between 15 and 18.122
The African Commission had been under-resourced in the past.123 It relied on 
outside sources for most of its works.124 Such dependence on outside sources 
subjected the Commission to serious criticisms that it was being manipulated by 
donors.125 Recently, financial resources of the Commission have been showing 
improvements. Since 2008, the Commission presents and defends its budget.126 
The Commission’s budget for the 2013 Financial Year stands at 8.5 million US 
Dollars (US $ 8,488,716).127
Likewise, the African Court does not have much time as the judges perform 
their functions on a part-time basis.128 The Court holds only four ordinary 
sessions a year.129 The Court may hold extraordinary sessions which may be 
convened by the President of the Court or at the request of a majority of 
members of the Court.130 Since there are no strict rules providing for a 
maximum number of extraordinary sessions to be held in a year, the Court can 
be flexible and hold more extraordinary sessions when there are more tasks. 
Nevertheless, it lacks the mandate to operate as a permanent judicial body.
A discussion on the admissibility of subregional courts’ decision before the 
African Commission would have been pointless had access to the African Court 
been open to individuals and NGOs. It is only the African Commission, state 
parties and African intergovernmental organisations that have direct access to 
the Court.131 Even the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child is omitted from the list of organs that have direct access to the 
Court although one may argue that it falls under African intergovernmental
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Report of the Brainstorming meeting on the African Commission, on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: 9-10 May 2006, Corinthia Atlantic Hotel, Banjul, The Gambia, 
Twentieth Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Annex II.
Ibid.
Viljoen (2007), supra note 1, p. 315.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Japhet Biegon & Magnus Killander (2009), ‘Human rights developments in the 
African Union during 2008’ African Journal of Human Rights Law 295, Vol. 9, at 297. 
AU Executive Council, Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2013
Financial Year, Doc. EX.CL/721(XXI).
Protocol on the African Court, art 15(4).
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Rules of Court, adopted and entered 
into force on 2 June 2010, Rule 14.
Ibid, rule 15.
Protocol on the African Court, Art 5(1).
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organisations.132 So far, few African states have made declarations under Article 
34(6) of the Protocol establishing the African Court to allow individuals and 
NGOs to submit cases directly to the African Court.133
The African Commission will, therefore, remain the major organ through 
which human rights cases are submitted to the African Court. The Commission’s 
referral of cases is discretionary. its Rules of Procedures provide for three 
illustrative instances of seizing the African Court with cases.134 First, the 
African Commission submits a case to the African Court when a respondent 
state fails to implement its recommendations that have been considered by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union within 180 
days.135
Second, the African Commission may refer a case to the African Court when 
a respondent state fails to comply with provisional measures.136 The African 
Charter is silent on provisional measures. However, the African Commission 
may order provisional measures to prevent irreparable damage to victims of 
human rights violations on the basis of its Rules of Procedures.137 The 
Commission has developed the practice of granting provisional measures.138
Third, the African Commission may submit a case that ‘constitutes serious or 
massive violations of human rights.’139 Besides, the Commission has an 
obligation to refer such cases to the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government.140 In 2011, the African Commission made its first reference under 
this rule in African Commission on Human and Peoples ’ Rights v Great 
Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.141 The Commission filed an application 
before the African Court on the basis of several communications that it received 
following the 2011 uprising against Mummar Qadafi’s regime in Libya. In its
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
Compare Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art 30(c). The 
Committee is listed as one of the organs having direct access before the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights.
Only Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali and Tanzania had mad declaration under 
article 34(6). See I de Meyer ‘Chart of ratifications: AU human rights treaties, 
Position as at 30 April 2012’ (2012) African Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 12, p. 308. 
African Commission Rules of Procedures, Rule 118.
Ibid, Rules 112(2) & 118(1).
Ibid, Rules 98 & 118(2).
Ibid, Rule 98(1).
See, for example, International Pen and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria 
(2000) AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998), para 8-9; Interights and Others (on behalf of 
Bosch) v Botswana (2003) AHRLR 55 (ACHPR 2003), para 10.
Ibid, rule 118(3).
African Charter, Article 58.
African Commission on Human and Peoples ’ Rights v the Great Socialist Libyan 
People’s Arab Jamahiriya, Application No. 004/2011, ruling 2 September 2011.
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submission as an applicant, the Commission alleged that violent suppression of 
demonstration by aerial bombardment and excessive use of heavy weapons and 
machine guns against the population resulting in death and injuries amounts ‘to 
serious violations of the right to life and to the integrity of persons, freedom of 
expression, demonstration and assembly.’142 The Court ordered provisional 
measures against Libya on its own motion as the Commission did not make a 
request to that effect.143
As long as direct access to the African Court by individuals and NGOs is 
limited and the Commission’s referral of cases remains discretionary, the 
solution to the massive backlog before the African Court is a distant possibility. 
Even more so, individuals and NGOs may bring cases that have already been 
decided by subregional courts to the African Commission with the hope of 
accessing the African Court. One may also optimistically assume that many 
African states will make declarations to allow individuals and NGOs to access 
the African Court. Under either scenario, there would be pressure on the 
resources of the African Court and the African Commission.
Africa should thus prudently use its regional human rights institution and 
scarce resources. Africans need to learn a lesson from the European Court of 
Human Rights, which has become ‘a victim of its own success’ in recent years 
as it ‘faces a docket crisis of massive proportions.’144 Narrowing the 
admissibility criteria has been taken as one of the steps to reform the European 
Court.145 It is, therefore, submitted that the African Commission and the African 
Court should not admit cases decided by subregional courts because such cases 
unnecessarily consume their scarce time and resources.
Any assumption that sub-regional courts might be subject to more local 
interests and open to manipulation is not supported by evidence. This 
assumption is not plausible because experience, on the contrary, shows that 
neighbouring countries are more concerned about human rights violations at 
their doorsteps. in fact, African governments with records of human rights 
violations rather incline towards opposing the human rights jurisdiction of 
subregional courts. These courts have been a challenge to states in the 
subregions. As evidenced by restructuring of East African Court of Justice and 
suspension of the SADC Tribunal, various African states are reacting to the
42 Ibid, para 2.
143 Ibid, para 9.
144 Laurence R Helfer (2008), ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: 
Embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the European human rights regime’ 
The European Journal of International Law 125, Vol. 19, p. 125.
145 Philip Leach (2009), ‘On reform of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
European Human Rights Law Review 725, Vol. 6, p. 728.
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decisions of subregional courts by amending their constitutions or taking other 
decisions. The assumption does not thus justify the admissibility of subregional 
courts’ decisions before the African Commission or African Court.
3.2. Finality of Subregional Courts’ Decisions
International146 courts or tribunals are usually empowered to render final and 
binding decisions no matter how different their subjects of jurisdiction are. A 
perusal of instruments establishing international courts and tribunals reveals that 
the finality of their decisions does not depend on the number of states party to 
the constituting instrument or on the permanent or temporary nature of the court 
or tribunal. For example, the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
to which almost all states are party, provides that the judgement of the Court is 
‘final and without appeal.’147 The 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement which was 
concluded between Ethiopia and Eritrea at the end of Ethio-Eritrean war can be 
another example.148 Article 5(17) of this Agreement establishes a neutral Claims 
Commission, a temporary arbitral tribunal, and provides that the decision of the 
Commission is ‘final and binding.’
The Treaties establishing subregional courts in Africa are no exception. They 
provide that the decisions of these courts are final and binding.149 These treaties 
foreclose any appeal from subregional courts to regional bodies like the African 
Commission and the African Court, or any other global courts and tribunals 
such as the ICJ. A concern raised in this regard is that ‘it may be desirable to 
give room for reference of cases from’ subregional courts as these courts are not 
‘specifically established for the purpose of human rights protection.’150
146 The word ‘international’ is used here to mean ‘connected with or involving more 
than one [state].’ See A S Hornby Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current 
English (2000) 680. It refers to all supra national institutions whether they are 
subregional, regional or global.
147 Art 60 of the Statute of International Court of Justice.
148 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea signed in Algiers, Algeria on 12 
December 2000 available at <http://server.nijmedia.nl/pca- 
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1030> (accessed on 13 November 2011).
149 Art 76(2) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty provides that the decision of the 
ECOWAS Community Court ‘shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal; Art 
16(5) of SADC Treaty provides that ‘the decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and 
binding.’ Art 35(1) of the Treaty Establishing the East African Community 
stipulates that the judgment of the Community Court is ‘final, binding and 
conclusive and not open to appeal.’ Art 31(1) the COMESA Treaty provides that the 
judgment of the COMESA Court is ‘final and conclusive and not open to appeal. ’
150 Solomon T Ebobrah (2009), ‘The admissibility of cases before the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: who should do what?’ Malawi Law Journal 87, Vol. 3, p. 98.
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Although a reference from subregional courts to the African Court may 
ensure a uniform interpretation of the African Charter, it overburdens the Court. 
Besides, there is no sufficient legal basis for making such references. Member 
states of RECs, subregional courts and other organs of RECs are bound by the 
provisions of their treaties according to which decisions of subregional courts 
are final and binding. Thus, their reference from subregional courts’ decision 
would be violation of treaties establishing these courts.
An inter-state reference from decisions of subregional courts, albeit 
unlikely, may be made by a state party to the African Charter (which is not a 
member of a particular REC) against another state party (which is a member of a 
particular REC). For example, Kenya which is not a member state of ECOWAS 
may refer an inter-state complaint to the African Court against, say, Ghana 
which is a member state of ECOWAS. In such scenarios, the state making 
reference would not be bound by the finality clause. Yet such reference would 
encounter the defence of res judicata as discussed below. Treaties establishing 
subregional courts do not also bind individuals and NGOs. However, their 
reference to the African Court will not fulfil admissibility requirement under 
Article 56(7) of the African Charter as discussed below.
3.3. Prohibition of Double Jeopardy
In Common Law legal system, double jeopardy means ‘the fact of being 
prosecuted twice for substantially the same offense.’151 The corresponding term 
in civil law legal system is non bis in idem.152 An accused person faced with the 
risk of double jeopardy can raise the plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois 
convict. Autrefois acquit is ‘a plea by a person indicted for a crime for which he 
or she had previously been tried and acquitted’ while autrefois convict is ‘a plea 
by a person indicted for a crime for which he or she had previously been tried 
and convicted.’153 The principle that a person should not be prosecuted twice for 
the same crime is recognised as a human rights principle.154 * 152 153 154
1 Bryan A. Garner (ed.) (2000), Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West Group), p. 506.
152 See Garner, supra note 151, p. 1665. The legal maxim ‘non bis in idem ’ or its 
imperative ‘ne bis in idem ’ literally means ‘not twice for the same thing.’ The maxim 
expresses the principle that ‘a person shall not be twice tried for the same crime.’
153 Susan Ellis Wild (ed) (2006), Webster’s New World Law Dictionary (Hoboken:
Wiley Publishing, Inc.) p. 38.
154 See art 14(7) of ICCPR. See Nihal Jayawickrama (2002), The Judicial Application of 
Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International Jurisprudence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.584. Jayawickrama argues that the right 
recognized in art 14(7) of ICCPR is broader in scope than the common law principle 
of autrefois convict.
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Article 56(7) of the African Charter extends the principle of double jeopardy 
beyond individuals to state parties since it prohibits the African Commission 
and the African Court from considering a matter that has already been settled. 
Thus, it establishes the rule ne bis in idem.155 Applied to a state, the rule implies 
that ‘a state should not be found in violation twice’ for the same action or 
conduct.156
In Bakweri Land Claims Committee v Cameroon, a communication was 
brought before the African Commission concerning sale of land owned or used 
by Bakweri, an indigenous community in Cameroon’s Fako division. The 
respondent state raised preliminary objection under Article 56(7)157 and argued 
that the communication was inadmissible as the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights had already settled the case.158 
While explaining the principle behind the requirement under Article 56(7), the 
Commission held the following:159
The principle behind the requirement under this provision of the African 
Charter is to desist from faulting member states twice for the same 
alleged violations of human rights. This is called the ne bis in idem rule 
(also known as the principle or prohibition of double jeopardy, deriving 
from criminal law) and ensures that, in this context, no state may be 
sued or condemned for the same alleged violation of human rights.
In Africa, human rights are expected to be protected at four levels: national, 
subregional, regional and global.160 The promotion and protection of human 
rights at subregional, regional and global levels fall within the international 
protection of human rights.161 Subregional courts are regarded as international 
courts because they are permanent organs established by international legal 
instruments and apply international law according to their own rules of 
procedure on disputes between states or disputes in which one of the parties is a 
state.162 If the cases that are already tried by subregional courts are admissible to 
the African Commission or the Court, the defendant states would be tried twice 
for the same conduct before international tribunals. Therefore, admitting cases
155
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Viljeon (2007), supra note 1, p. 126.
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Bakweri Land Claims Committee v Cameroon (2004) AHRLR 43 (ACHPR 2004). 
Ibid, para 38.
Ibid, para 52.
Viljoen (2007), supra note 1, p. 9. Africa has subregional institutions that deal with
human rights.
Ibid.
Lucyline Nkata Murungi (2009), ‘Revisiting the role of sub-regional courts in the 
protection of Human rights in Africa’ unpublished LLM thesis, University of 
Pretoria, p. 32.
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decided by subregional courts before the African Commission or Court would 
violate the prohibition of double jeopardy.
3.4. Res judicata Effect of Subregional Courts’ Decisions
Prohibition of double jeopardy is closely related to the principle of res judicata. 
The African Commission held that the principle of double jeopardy is connected 
with ‘the recognition of the fundamental res judicata status of judgments issued 
by international and regional tribunals and/or institutions such as the African 
Commission.’163 Res judicata can be defined as: “[a]n affirmative defense 
barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or 
any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of transactions and 
that could have been — but was not — raised in the first suit”. 164
According to the African Commission, res judicata ‘is the principle that a 
final judgment of a competent court/tribunal is conclusive upon the parties in 
any subsequent litigation involving the same cause of action.’165 It implies that 
‘decision in the circumstances is final, binding and without appeal.’166
Certain grounds have been advanced to justify res judicata161 First, res 
judicata serves public interest because the general public interest requires 
ending ‘disputes that have already been litigated by establishing the finality of 
judicial decisions.’168 Secondly, it is used as ‘a means to reduce controversies 
and disputes and to promote stability.’169 Thirdly, it saves courts’ time as it 
ensures ‘the economic efficiency of the courts and the speedy termination of 
controversies.’110
The ICJ considered the principle of res judicata in Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case.111
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The case dealt with claim of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and 
Montenegro for violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide by destroying and attempting to destroy in whole 
national, ethnical or religious groups within the territory of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.172 The Court identified two purposes of res judicata.173 
‘First, the stability of legal relations requires that litigation come to an end.’174 
‘secondly, it is in the interest of each party that an issue which has already been 
adjudicated in favour of that party be not argued again.’175
For a case to be barred by res judicata, it must pass ‘the triple identity 
test.’176 That is, res judicata ‘applies where there is an identity of parties, 
identity of cause, and identity of subject-matter in between the earlier and 
subsequent proceedings.’177 Based on the Civil Procedure Acts of Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania, the East African Court of Justice laid down almost a 
similar test.178 The Court identified three situations that are essential to apply res 
judicata:179 “One, the matter must be ‘directly and substantially’ in issue in the 
two suits. Two, parties must be the same or parties under whom any of them 
claim litigating under the same title. Lastly, the matter was finally decided in the 
previous suit.”
The African Commission applied this test in Bakweri Land Claims 
Committee case when it held that the ‘parties before the African Commission 
have not disputed the fact that they were the very same parties at loggerheads 
before the UN Sub-Commission disputing the same issues as before the African 
Commission.’180 However, the Commission does not consider decision on 
admissibility as a final settlement of the matter. The principle of res judicata 
applies when the decision has been taken on the merits.
In this case, the Commission considered a communication that had already 
been declared inadmissible by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights.181 It was of the opinion that had there been final 
settlement of the matter, the decision of the UN Sub-Commission would have
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180 
181
Ibid, para 65.
Ibid, para 116.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Michael Ottolenghi & Peter Prows (2009), ‘Res Judicata in the ICJ's Genocide Case: 
Implications for Other Courts and Tribunals?’ Pace International Law Review 37, 
Vol. 21, at 48.
Genocide case, supra note 162, joint dissenting opinion of judges Ranjeva, Shi and 
Koroma.
Katabazi case, supra note 53, para 31.
Ibid; see also Garner, supra note 151, p. 1052.
Bakweri Land Claims Committee case, supra note 157, para 53. Emphasis supplied. 
Ibid, para 50.
268 Mizan Law Review Vol. 6 No.2, December 2012
had res judicata status and the case would have been inadmissible under Article 
56(7) of the African Charter.182 Assuming that its decisions remain consistent, 
the African Commission is thus expected to recognise the res judicata effect of 
subregional courts’ decisions. The admissibility requirements of the African 
Commission mutatis mutandis apply to the African Court since both rely on the 
African Charter.
Analogy can also be made between the African Court and the ICJ. Article 60 
of the Statute of the ICJ provides that its judgment is ‘final and without appeal.’ 
In Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, the ICJ held that the ‘fundamental character of that principle 
appears from the terms of the Statute of the Court and the Charter of the United 
Nations.’183
Similarly, the African Court Protocol provides that the ‘judgment of the 
Court decided by majority shall be final and not subject to appeal.’184 If the 
African Court faces cases that have already been decided by subregional courts, 
it may derive the principle of res judicata from its protocol. The caveat in this 
analogy is that the ICJ applied the principle in its own previous judgment.
There are exceptions to the principle of res judicata. A court may review and 
interpret its decisions. For example, the African Court can review its judgment 
on the basis of new evidence.185 It can also interpret its judgment.186 With the 
exception of revision and interpretation, res judicata has the effect of barring the 
litigants from taking the same case to another court with hopes of obtaining a 
different judgment, or in anticipation of raising new issues that were not raised 
at the previous trial.187 Therefore, the African Commission and the Court may 
apply the principle of res judicata to cases that have already decided by 
subregional courts.
3.5. Subregional Courts under Article 56(7)
Article 56(7) of the African Charter deals with the settlement of certain matters 
without, however, laying down any criterion for identifying an adjudicatory 
organ. Nevertheless, the African Commission has adopted certain criteria in its 
jurisprudence. In Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, the African 
Commission held that it is improper to require the complainant to exhaust 
domestic remedies from a body that does not ‘operate impartially’ and that has
182 Ibid, para 53.
183 Genocide case, supra note 171, para 115.
184 Protocol on the African Court, art 28(2).
185 Ibid, Art 28(3).
186 Ibid, Art 28(4).
187 Wild, supra note 153, p. 244.
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no ‘obligation to decide according to legal principles’.188 The African 
Commission “would not rely on the process or mechanism of a ‘discretionary, 
extra-ordinary ... non-judicial nature’ to preclude the admissibility of a 
communication under Article 56(7) of the African Charter”.189
From the few decisions of the African Commission, it can be gathered that 
the Commission has depended on the nature of a tribunal or an organ to 
ascertain whether it falls under Article 56(7) of the African Charter. If a tribunal 
is of a judicial nature, or if it has an obligation to decide according to legal 
principles, then it falls under Article 56(7). Interights v Ethiopia and Eritrea 
illustrates the point.190 In this case, the complainant claimed that expulsion or 
deportation of Eritreans from Ethiopia and that of Ethiopians from Eritrea 
during the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998 violated Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7(1), 
12(1), 12 (2), 12(4), 12(5) 14, 15, 16 and 18(1) of the African Charter.191 In 
their submissions on admissibility, both Eritrea and Ethiopia argued that the 
communication was inadmissible under Article 56(7) of the African Charter.192 
The African Commission considered the nature of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims 
Commission that was established by the 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement 
concluded between Ethiopia and Eritrea.193
The African Commission extended the test of ‘obligation to decide according 
to legal principles’ to identify organs that fall under Article 56(7) of the African 
Charter.194 The African Commission held that the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims 
Commission falls under those bodies envisaged under Article 56(7) as the 
Claims Commission ‘is bound to apply rules of international law and cannot 
make decisions ex aequo et bono.’195
As the African Commission accepts the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission 
as a body envisaged under Article 56(7), it should also view subregional courts 
in the same way for stronger reasons. subregional courts are more judicial in 
nature than the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission because the former are 
courts while the latter is an arbitral tribunal.196 Consisting of five arbitrators, the
188 Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Akamu and Others) v Nigeria (2000) 
AHRLR 180 (ACHPR 1995), para 8.
189 Communication 233/99, Interights (on behalf of Pan African Movement and 
Citizens for Peace in Eritrea) v Ethiopia and Communication 234/99, Interights (on 
behalf of Pan African Movement and Inter Africa Group) v Eritrea, Sixteenth 
Activity Report 2002-2003, Annex VII.
190 Ibid, para 56.
191 Ibid, para 1-9.
192 Ibid, para 28-29.
193 Algiers Peace Agreement, supra note 148, Art 5.
194 Interights v. Ethiopia and Eritrea, supra note 189, para 56.
Ibid.6 See Art 5 of the Algiers Agreement, supra note 148.
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Claims Commission was mandated ‘to decide through binding arbitration’197 
and the Claims Commission was required to use the 1992 Permanent Court of 
Arbitration Optional Rules.198 Moreover, the Claims Commission is 
temporary,199 while subregional courts are permanent.
The other point stressed by the African Commission is a duty of a court or a 
tribunal to apply rules of international law to be within the purview of Article 
56(7). Obviously, subregional courts have the duty to apply rules of 
international law. As international treaties constitute one of the primary sources 
of international law,200 subregional courts are empowered to adjudicate on 
international treaties.201 For example, in developing its own jurisprudence, the 
SADC Tribunal has expressly stated that it should have ‘regard to applicable 
treaties, general principles and rules of public international law and any rules 
and principles of the law of States.’202 In Campbell the SADC Tribunal referred 
to several international treaties including the UN Charter while the ECOWAS 
Court of Justice based its decision on several international human rights 
treaties.203
Subregional courts, albeit few, also have a human rights mandate while the 
Claims Commission did not have clear human rights mandate. Subregional 
courts are more likely to deal with human rights cases than the Claims 
Commission. Moreover, the number of state parties to the treaties establishing 
subregional courts is greater than that of the parties to the Algiers agreement, if 
numbers matter at all. Thus, subregional courts are envisaged under Article 
56(7) of the African Charter.
3.6. Textual Interpretation of the African Charter
The text of the African Charter could be interpreted to include subregional 
courts. Article 56(7) of the African Charter provides:
Communications relating to human and peoples' rights ... shall be 
considered if they. [d]o not deal with cases which have been settled by 
the states involved in accordance with ... [the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union] or the provisions of the present Charter.
197 Ibid, Art 5(1) & (2).
198 Ibid, Art 5(7).
199 Ibid, Art 5(8) & (12).
200 Art 38(1)(a) of Statute of International Court of Justice.
201 See Art 27(1) of Treaty Establishing East African Economic Community; Art 16(1) 
of Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development 
Community, as Amended.
202 Art 21(b) of SADC Protocol on the Tribunal and Rules of Procedure Thereof.
203 Campbell case, supra note 75; Manneh case, supra note 22; Koraou case, supra note 
25; SERAP case, supra note 37.
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If the case is settled by subregional courts, can such cases be considered as cases 
that have been settled in accordance with the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union? Although subregional courts are not organs of the African Union (AU), 
it could be said that RECs were envisaged within the framework of the AU. For 
example, Article 3(l) of the Constitutive Act provides that one of the objectives 
of the AU is to harmonise the activities of RECs. Further evidence that RECs 
are within the framework of the AU is found in the AU Assembly’s Rules of 
Procedure.204 Article 34(2) provides that the regulations and directives of the 
AU Assembly bind RECs. This provision obviously binds organs of RECs, 
including subregional courts.
Article 56(7) of the African Charter prohibits the admissibility of cases that 
have been settled in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter. 
subregional courts can settle cases in accordance with the provisions of the 
African Charter because Article 56(7) of the African Charter does not require 
that the organ that settles cases in accordance with the African Charter be 
established by the African Union. Moreover, there is no requirement that such 
organ should be established on a particular level. Practically speaking, the 
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, a subregional court, is deciding cases in 
accordance with the African Charter.205
However, it may be argued that subregional courts were not intended to be 
included under Article 56(7) because these courts were not established at the 
time when the African Charter was being drafted. The article only refers to the 
Organs established by the African Charter or Protocol to the African Charter. In 
this view, it is only the African Commission or the African Court that can settle 
cases in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter.
This argument which is based on historical circumstances does not render the 
‘prudential interpretation’206 of the African Charter invalid. Giving a monopoly 
of settling matters in accordance with the African Charter to the continental 
organs alone requires the insertion of the phrase ‘before the organs established 
by the present Charter’ at the end of Article 56(7) of the African Charter. Thus, 
the text of the African Charter could be understood as precluding the African 
Commission or the African Court from admitting cases that have already been 
decided by subregional courts.
204 Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union, ASS/AU/2(I) - a, Assembly of the 
African Union, First Ordinary Session 9 - 10 July 2002 Durban, South Africa.
205 Manneh case, supra note 22; Koraou case, supra note 25; SERAP case, supra note 
37.
206 Here, ‘Prudential interpretation’ is used to mean the interpretation that allows wise 
use of the African Court and the African Commission.
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Conclusion
African Human rights architecture has become substantially different from other 
regions of the world since subregional courts have ventured into human rights 
matters.207 Human rights mandate of these courts is now clear from their 
constitutions and decisions although such decisions have had bad consequences 
for the courts in some instances. However, the relation of subregional courts 
with the African Commission and the African Court is not clear. In particular, it 
is not clear whether cases decided by subregional courts are admissible before 
the African Commission or the African Court.
Cases decided by subregional courts have not yet been submitted to the 
African Commission or the African Court. The main reason seems to be that the 
involvement of subregional courts in human rights matters is a recent 
phenomenon and the number of cases entertained by these courts is very few. As 
a result, the African Commission or the African Court has not decided on the 
admissibility of cases from subregional courts. Still, Yogogombaye v Senegal 
hints that such submission is inevitable and will be made in the near future.
Consideration or revision of subregional courts’ decisions by the African 
Commission or the African Court might have advantages such as ensuring 
uniform interpretation of the African Charter. However, the legal basis for 
referring cases from subregional courts to the African Court or the African 
Commission is shaky. There is not sufficient legal basis for establishing 
hierarchical structure between the continental human rights bodies and 
subregional courts.
Admitting cases that have already been decided by subregional courts would 
have repercussions. it would overburden the African Commission and the 
African Court as these continental human rights bodies have little time to deal 
with cases. it would put the defendant state in a difficult position, as the 
decisions of these courts are final according to treaties establishing them. it 
would result in trying the defendant states twice by international institutions for 
the same violation. It would contradict the principles of res judicata. It would 
contradict some decisions of the African Commission. Therefore, the African 
Commission and the African Court should not admit cases that have already 
been decided by subregional courts. _________ ■
207 The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice has clear human rights mandate. The 
SADC Tribunal ruled that it has human rights mandate. The East African Court of 
Justice upheld human rights despite suspension of its human rights jurisdiction.
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